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1. - Introduction – The paper focuses on the EU social model and its «double», that is to say 
the others, those left out, the non-EU citizens who come to seek work in the context of 
processes of economic migration, or who already have a job even if not always declared. The 
essay faces the theme of migrant workers in the context of EU common policy after Lisbon. It 
focuses on two related levels of discussion that consider the Mediterranean emergence part of 
a reflection that cannot be disregarded. We consider that the recurring emergency (since 2001) 
still continues to be the cause justifying exceptions to the rights of migrants. The waived rights 
are mainly of three types: citizenship, mobility and social inclusion rights. After reconstructing 
the evolution of the common EU policy (see par. 2 – 4), we argue that the structural response 
to the emergency passes through the affirmation of a systemic inclusive approach. 
Taking into consideration the institutional framework, as outlined in the Treaties, the analysis 
highlights the link between emergency and Rule of Law, to be rethought through a most 
significant contribution of the international rules. Our purpose is to recognize that the EU can 
overcome the obstacles of the revision of the competence settings provided by the Treaties 
without any formal modification. 
The interpretative perspective hereby proposed takes into account the promotion of the 
principle of equal treatment recently affirmed by the Court of Justice in the Tümer case, on 5 
November 2014 (C-311/13). The protective function of labour law lies in this preliminary 
significant reaffirmation. In particular, the enhancement of the principle of equal treatment 
leads to two major results:  
- it recognizes renewed theoretical and practical relevance to the powers vested by Title X of 
the TFEU, Social Policy, to the detriment of the permanent turn to Title V, Freedom Security 
and Justice, concerning the employment of immigrant workers, especially if irregular; 
- it challenges the idea that every measure of affirmation of the rights of illegal immigrants 
produces irregularities and that the only instruments available to the (national and EU) 
authorities  are the refoulement procedures for illegal immigrants. 
This article seeks to focus on and explain those “irresistible” factors that affect these 
regulatory choices on immigration by supporting a social integration process within the EU, 
which is accompanied by a parallel process of social negation vis-a-vis non-EU subjects. One 
of the most obvious signs of this process is a transformation of the regulatory approach 
concerning economic migration from a horizontal to a category-based perspective, rather than 
a movement directed towards employment seeking, (instead of  some rules exclusively 
dedicated to defined categories such as seasonal workers or highly qualified workers). In an 
attempt to provide an up-to-date reading of the most recent acts in the law of this subjects, the 
analysis will also focus on dir. 2011/98/UE, the so-called directive concerning permits and 
equal treatment of non-EU regular workers, which reminds one of the first formal statement of 
such a principle in 1974, as well as on the recent Dir. 2014/36/eu of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country 
nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal. 
 
2. – From the horizontal approach to the category-based approach to economic migration: the 
parabola of the Commission policy from Tampere to the aims of Europe 2020 – If a precise 
birthday can be found for the common policy concerning immigration in the European Union, 
it is certainly the date of the European Council held in Tampere on 15th and 16th October, 
1999. On that occasion and after the Amsterdam Treaty came into force the preceding May, 
the projected targets attained their maximum extent. The development prospects, however, 
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were evaluated as inadequate if compared against their initial premises.  Later experience, in 
fact, overwhelmingly demonstrated that, at least in economic migration, the official consensus 
achieved by the Council was only apparent (Carrera 2011). The directive proposal concerning 
the conditions of entry and residence of non-EU citizens who intend to undertake employment 
or self-employment (Com (2001) 386 def., of 11 July 2001) – which is the principal result of 
the positions taken in Tampere – has never been approved by the Council. The failure of that 
directive proposal is clearly seen in the forced withdrawal of the proposal by the 
Commission1, formalized five years later. The reason lies in the impossibility of reaching an 
agreement within the Council, between the most representative states. 
More than ten years later, this episode represents a crucial unsolved problem in economic 
migration. Standardized rules for access to employment in the 28 member states do not exist 
yet2, showing that, as in the past, the inconsistent dialectic between the Commission and the 
Council seems to be destined to affect future projected developments characterized by the 
evident hostility of the member states to renouncing specific responsibilities which is much 
more evident in this sphere than in others. 
Even if the responsibilities of the Union in this sphere have greatly increased in a short time 
particularly with requests, action plans, programmes, positions, documents, projects, this has 
passed always under the banner of that dialectical relationship between the member states and 
the Commission, which characterizes the whole route covered by the common policy 
concerning economic migration in a real and visible way. Following the failure of the 2001 
proposal, economic migration became part of a global policy concerning general immigration 
rather than employment: it is no longer subject to direct and immediate (hence problematic) 
regulation by the Union but has lost focus and has watered down and mixed with other 
matters. That’s to say that only the indirect political approach has allowed the Commission to 
include rules concerning foreign workers among the projected tasks starting from the 
responsibilities in Title IV TEC first, and Title V TFEU, second (excluded even from scholars 
and from policy makers in Title X) (Peers 2008). 
3. – Before Lisbon – After 2001, with all the weight of the 2001 violent events, which had 
such an impact on the development of rules concerning economic migration, three steps 
defined the overall approach to the movement of non-EU persons for employment. The first 
step came between 2005 and 2007. It was characterised by the adoption of the Green Paper on 
economic migration at the beginning of 20053. This Paper was anticipated by the discussion 
within the Council of The Hague held later that year in December and by the following 																																																								
1  Cf. European Commission, Withdrawal of Commission Proposal Following Screening for their General 
Relevance, their Impact on Competitiveness and Other Aspects, 2006/C 64/03 published in the Official Journal of 
the European Community 17 March 2006.	
2 The same can ideally accompany the complicated events of the earlier decision no. 85/381/EEC, when another 
attempt was made to draw up a first draft concerning immigration.	
3 In the Introduction, penultimate section, the Commission explains that the initiative “does not aim […] either to 
illustrate the policies of the EU 25, or to compare them to those of other regions in the world, but rather to point 
out the main problems and possible options for a Community legislative discipline concerning economic 
immigration. In doing so, the Commission has taken account of the reservations and worries raised by the 
member states during the discussions which took place concerning the 2001 directive and proposes possible 
alternatives”. In the Conclusions, first section, it adds: the “Commission holds that the admission of migrants for 
economic motives is the milestone in the policy concerning immigration and it is therefore necessary to deal with 
it at a European level in the context of a progressive evolution of a coherent Community policy for immigration”. 
«Coherence» and «progression» are terms that accompany every single consideration on this matter, joined by the 
term «global», which effectively obscures the economic/employment question.	
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Commission’s Plan for Legal Migration, in which the selective dismantling of the figure of the 
worker became the model for the Commission’s subsequent Legislative and Work Programme 
adopted in November 20064. At that time the already approved directive proposals and those 
still to be approved concerning employment of foreigners appeared, while a directive proposal 
was inserted concerning the rights of foreign regular workers. This one, indeed, disappeared 
from the list the following month at the European Council in Brussels at the end of the Finnish 
presidency. The conclusions reaffirmed the unease of some member states about taking 
decisions in these matters euphemistically expressed in the formula “fully respecting national 
powers” and made evident in the attitude assumed during negotiations of the subsequently 
approved directives (Carrera 2011). 
Scholars pointed out that the basic deficiency of the policy set out by the EU is the so-called 
proximity, with some of the more significant and representative member states of the Union 
showing that in the dialectical relation between the Commission and the Council, the latter has 
prevailed. If such proximity with the single or several national interests allows the approval of 
the acts, it is the same proximity which puts at risk: the overall approach of the Community 
and the building of a comprehensive immigration policy rooted in the principles of solidarity 
and openness whose long-term effects would bring efficiency in terms of security of 
employment and a high level of protection for the legal employability and working conditions 
of immigrant workers (Carrera 2011). 
Before the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the so-called Labour Immigration Policy, taking 
into consideration the principles of subsidiarity and national proximity, was deemed to be 
substantially without transnational coherence – even if expressed in different terms – divided 
between the various needs of national labour markets, fluctuating on the basis of local 
economic needs and bound up with the political priorities of each member state. The merely 
formal common policy was substantially represented by the different rules and policies in the 
28 EU States, an only apparent unity which inspires the EU immigration strategy. 
 
4.  – After Lisbon – With the restyling of the powers and the generalization of the ordinary 
directive approval procedure carried out at Lisbon, has the overall picture changed? The basic 
question to ask is if the Commission’s strategy concerning economic migration has become 
proactive after 13 December 2007, stimulated by the rules that came into force two years later. 																																																								
4 The activism of the Commission and the Council in 2005 to overcome the impasse caused by the failed 
agreement on the 2001 proposal was considerable also on the basis of the mandate received at the Council of The 
Hague at the end of 2004 (Communication of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, The 
programme of the Hague: ten priorities for the next five years, Partnership for the renewal of Europe in the areas 
of freedom, security and justice, Com(2005) 184 def.). After the Green Paper on economic migration 
[Com(2004) 811 def., of 1st November 2005], the Commission published the first document of reply to the 
consultation the following 30th November 2005 (Communication of the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament – Action priority in response to the challenges of immigration – First initiative taken after 
the Hampton Court meeting, Com(2005) 621 def.), during the six month English presidency of the Council, 
followed on 21 December 2005 by the Communication of the Commission, Action Plan on Legal Immigration 
[Sec(2005) 1680, Com(2005) 669]. With regard to the Council, we should remember the Note of the Presidency 
on the global approach to immigration: priority actions regarding Africa and the Mediterranean (15744/05 
presented at Brussels on 13 December 2012, notes which are inspired by the Pact on immigration and asylum of 
2008) and the Conclusions of the Presidency to the European Council at Brussels of 15th and 16th December 2005 
(SN 15914/01/05, 30/12/05).  It is worth noting that the outcome of the consultation on the Green Book of 2005 
is a demonstration of the dialectical relationship between Commission and Council. The conclusions were widely 
laid aside, as S. Carrera recalls in Building a Common Policy on Labour Immigration … cit.	
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To fully understand the real situation concerning developments following the Lisbon Treaty, 
at least two further geopolitical steps must be added to complete the developing picture briefly 
outlined: the signing of the European Pact on immigration and asylum proposed by the French 
presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy on 15 and 16 October 2008 (Carrera, Guild 2008); the Stockholm 
Programme of May 2010, and the following action plan which gives guidelines for 
intervention by the Union in this matter so as to link up to (more or less completely) the 
objectives of Europe 2020. The French doctrine, in particular, recognises the central role of 
the French president in the definition of a clear physiognomy of the EU common policy: “So 
there isn’t a European immigration policy, but a European police of foreigners governed by 
the commands of the labour market” (Chemillier-Gendrau 2007).  
The directives approved between 2008 and 2009 are the tangible result of this kind of policy, 
as stemming from the Council document of 2005 on the global approach to immigration of 
which the 2007 legislative programme is the tangible result politically supported by the Pact of 
20085. The Pact, presented as brand new to the great media attention, does nothing but re-
propose measures already approved and focuses on the concept of chosen immigration 
(choisie), a policy with a strongly utilitarian approach, various speeds, and the tendency to put 
the foreigner in a precarious legal status (Daugareilh 2012). A series of checks taken from the 
theoretical analysis of the models carried out in the 80s, showed their complete inadequacy in 
particular with regard to the development of ad hoc international relations, which appear to be 
much more efficient. 
One cannot but notice an imbalance, a kind of identity crisis between EU immigration policy 
which claims to aspire to a global policy and which, on the other hand, can only focus on the 
repression of illegal immigration and on the strengthening of frontier controls. With regard to 
economic immigration, the political apparatus is judged fragmented, incoherent, restrictive, 
inefficient, unfocussed (Carrera, Faure Atger, Guild, Kostakopoulou …), a long series of adjectives 
that have brought the scholars, with particular regard to the evolution of EU policies, to 
wonder if such a programmatic picture can be held to be compatible with the strategic 
priorities of Europe 2020 and capable of contributing to their achievement. In particular, this 
question arises where they indicate «inclusive growth» as the specific target that the 
Commission proposes to reach even by facilitating and promoting mobility of the workforce 
within the EU. This is proposed in order to guarantee a greater balance between labour supply 
and demand, with adequate financial support from the structural funds, in particular from the 
European Social Fund (ESF), as well as to promote a policy of worker migration which is both 
global and long-term so as to respond to the priorities and needs of the labour markets with the 
necessary flexibility6. 
It is the paradigm of the border as a metaphor for the barrier that seems to inspire EU policy. 																																																								
5 Although having merely a programmatic political value, the Pact establishes with clarity the distinguishing 
marks of the common EU policy. In particular, the five points which rather characterize it should be remembered: 
1. To organize legal immigration taking account of the priorities, the needs and the precise reception capacities of 
every member state and to favour integration ; 2. Combat irregular immigration, in particular,  making secure and 
efficient the return of foreigners in irregular situations to their country of origin or towards a country of transit; 3. 
Improve the efficiency of external border checks; 4. Construct a Europe for asylum; 5. Consolidate a global 
partnership with the countries of origin and transit to encourage co-operation between migration and 
development. Worth noting in the context of Objective 2, is the undertaking by member states to resort to the 
regularizations case by case only for humanitarian or economic motives.  The horizontal policy for economic 
migration is thus definitively abandoned.	
6 Communication of the European Commission 2020, A Strategy for an intelligent, sustainable and inclusive 
growth, Brussels, 3.3.2010, Com(2010) 2020 def.	
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Precisely today the term «barrier» seems to be the most suited to catch the moods of the 
legislators, not only national, and to mark the most recent regulative results, the real theme of 
this research as indicated in the foreword. With the disappearance of the physical borders 
shown on geographical maps (the internal borders of the EU, for example), one notes a 
multiplication of borders in the economic, political, anthropological and social reality. Law 
cannot remain unaffected by this dynamic; on the contrary, it can seek to enlarge or reduce the 
extent at the level of the European Union too. In this context, the presumed neutrality of law 
seems more a theoretical alibi than a fact of legislative reality as the recent experience of 
labour law concerning immigration shows. In this respect it has been noted that the topic of 
economic mobility from outside the Union assumes a peculiar value as shown by the 
reconstruction above and witnesses the development of a policy with the vice of exclusion 
imported into EU law-making from the struggle against irregular immigration rather than its 
opposite – the virtuous relationship between citizenship and employment. The status of 
irregular is not even a risk or a threat; it becomes simply a juridical situation of those people 
who stay irregularly on the territory of a member state while the Union works out ad hoc 
juridical instruments to which must be given particular attention: behind the rhetoric of the 
struggle against irregular immigration hides the criminalization of foreigners in irregular 
situations and following this, their expulsion. 
It is clear that a regulatory system that considers the foreigner as a threat or someone 
deserving repression must be strictly examined also on the basis of its respect for fundamental 
human rights (even if moving to find employment). From a labour law point of view economic 
efficiency and respect for human rights are complementary. The labour law approach in 
particular does not distinguish between legal and illegal immigration; as a consequence, the 
role of the employment contract is crucial besides the fact (highly significant for the entire 
disciplinary balance of labour immigration law) that labour law gives precedence to the status 
of worker over that of migrant. 
Arguing from the French doctrine (Daugareilh 2012), the uncomfortable slope on which EU 
law has placed labour experts makes one constantly wonder whether the worker has to be 
punished or protected. A far-from-simple reply, which requires a reconstruction of the entire 
multi-layered context regarding the safeguards for personal rights up to the relevance of 
questions concerning so-called decent work, and which touches on the roles of the various 
courts as guardians of fundamental rights (Lo Faro 2008; Daugareilh 2006). 
Whether these observations are to be considered valid for the post Lisbon Treaty period it is 
not an easy question to answer given that a large number of acts passed after 2009 are the 
result of earlier policies and programmatic decisions. Yet to be evaluated completely is, 
therefore, the reality of the EU order strongly shaken by the inflow of people following the so-
called «Arab Spring», events that bring one to see EU policy as a clear example of the failure 
of a «non policy» in the field of migration. These events have not helped to qualify the 
Mediterranean countries as decision makers but always as spectators in this field. 
The extreme difficulty in finding a complete answer to such a wide question does not mean we 
cannot offer a further comparative element to the technicalities of the discussion. Article 68 
TFEU recognizes the European Council’s responsibility in “strategic direction of the 
legislative programme and its application in the area of freedom, security and justice”. On 4 
May 2010 the Programme of Stockholm, which gives political form and substance to Title V 
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of TFEU, was published in the Official Journal of the European Union7. It deserves attention 
for the part of the single planned actions indicated with the relative deadline among which the 
undertaking to draw up a Code for legal immigration (to be published between 2013 and 2014) 
should not be forgotten. Scholars have already publicly proposed a long and thorough draft, 
the interest in the code seems to lie in the fact that it will be a kind of basic text on the subject 
(by itself already innovative), intended moreover to consolidate the existing regulations 
concerning immigration (as explained by point 6.1.4 of the Stockholm Programme) and to 
impact, as quickly as possible, on immigration for economic reasons. It should be noted 
indeed that the Council (Peers 2012), at point 6.1.3 of the Programme, invites the 
Commission, among other tasks «to evaluate the impact and the efficiency of the measures 
adopted in this sphere so as to determine if it is necessary to strengthen the existing legislation, 
also in relation to categories of workers presently not covered by the Union’s regulations». 
The specific point is really enigmatic. It seems like an attempt, if not to recover the integrity of 
the entire migration policy, much less than an open prospective for a renewed initiative of a 
horizontal type on the employment of foreigners ten years after the failure of the proposal 386 
of 2001, interesting in the political dialectic between European Commission and Council 
(which, compared to the 2007-2010 period, involves considerable changes in the 
representatives of the national governments). 
An indirect way, perhaps, to repair the fault of the (substantial) fragmentation of the initiative 
concerning employment also in light of the economic-financial crisis and of the impact 
produced on the foreign workforce.  By comparing the Commission’s 2005 Green Paper on 
economic migration with the 2012 Report on Immigration, some useful suggestion can be 
found, helping to formulate a reply given that the crisis is an integral part of the reasoning 
about the economic contribution of foreigners in the EU, which remains central. The 
Commission reaffirms that “economic migration remains (…) an important element to make 
up for an insufficient workforce, above all in the context of an ageing EU population and in an 
international market where there is strong competition with non-European countries for talent, 
these also hit by a lack of skills”. It adds that “more than contributing to economic growth, the 
migrants offer our society a social and cultural contribution”. For all these reasons “the 
Commission proposes to start again concerning economic migration by setting up before the 
end of 2012 a consultation which promotes a wide debate with the member states, the social 
institutions and the various interested parties, on the role that European policies should have 
so as to exploit the potential of economic migration in a period of crisis in terms of political 
action by the Commission” [p. 5]. EU harmonization in this specific area limited itself to the 
approval of several directives (dir. 2008/115, dir. 2009/52), a series of acts intended to 
regulate 32.5% of almost 2.5 million first stay permits for non-EU citizens for the undertaking 
of paid employment8. 
Awareness of the failure is not even concealed, the reply to the question just posed does not 
appear reassuring: ten years later it goes back to the beginning, showing that the regulatory 																																																								
7 The Stockholm Programme was adopted by the Direction Justice and Home Affairs in December 2009. The 
scheduled plan came the following 20 April: Communication by the Commission to the European Parliament, to 
the Council, to the European Economic and Social Committee and to the Committee for the Regions, Create a 
space of freedom, security and justice for the citizens of Europe Action Plan for the realization of the Stockholm 
Programme (Com(2010) 171).	
8 In the Third annual report on immigration and asylum (p. 3) in which the reported data can be found, it  is 
added that the remainder of the entries is divided among family motives (30.2%) and study motives (20.6%), 
whilst the remaining 17%  comprises motives of protection, stay without work permit, …).	
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initiatives concerning labour immigration policy are always below expectations. 
The new Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The 
European economic and social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A European 
Agenga on Migration of 2015 (Com(2015) 240 final) adopts the same approach: the four 
pillars drew to manage migration better still focus on the external borders’ security and aim at 
the reduction of push factors towards irregular entry and stay. The distinction between legally 
admitted and irregularly staying workers is the fundamental approach of EU new Agenda, 
together with an increase of the returns rate and a better enforcement of the Employers 
Sanctions Directive. On the labour law and social policy side, the categorisation of migrants 
still continues to be the guiding light of the Commission, despite the Bluecard experience had 
already shown all its weaknesses. The modernisation of Visa, with the creation of a new 
“Touring Visa” concerning non-Eu citizens travelling through the Schengen area for a period 
between 90 and 180 days, will complete the picture, adding complexity, separations and bias. 
Scholars are indeed moving into a complete different direction: a group of researchers9 re-
propose a series of guidelines to deal with the topic of immigration, and not only economic 
immigration. The recommendation n. 1 (The understanding of immigration) contains the 
recurrent statement, repeated but unheard up to today: “The correlation between employment 
policy and migration should therefore be taken very seriously and developed further”. 
 
5. Back to the Rule of law? - As highlighted above (see §1), the emergency situation caused by 
the Mediterranean tragedies suggests rethinking Europe’s policy and considering migration 
within the social perimeter of EU Law. One of the most important reasons to do so in our 
opinion is that migration policy challenges the EU rule of law. 
Scholars and policy makers have already faced this debate from several points of view. The 
first important question stemmed from the asylum politics and regulations. This happened in 
different ways and directions. On one side, issues concerning the asylum requests have shown 
and put under the spotlight the struggle for authority that has been engaged from the various 
actors and institutions dealing with the emergency problems that rose in the recent years. 
Scholars clearly reported the involvement in this fight of the different foreign affairs and 
military actors of several Member states. At the same time, we assisted to a struggle between 
Member states and EU institutions (Carrera, den Hertog, 2015, 1, Bogdandy, Ioannidis, 2014, 
59).  Most recently, the long debate that preceded the coming into force of the Triton Jo and 
the take over of the Italian mission Mare Nostrum focused on the question whether EU and 
Frontex did not have any mandate and capabilities to carry out SAR (Search and Rescue) 
operations. The Agency said it couldn’t focus on SAR under the applicable rule of law 
framework. Referring to this last event, scholars observed that the rule of law can be used, and 
indeed has been used, to refrain from taking action (Carrera, den Hertog, 2015, 10). On the 
other hand, as we will demonstrate here, one might say that the asylum issues have shown how 
the rule of law and the principles of legality and democracy might be challenged when dealing 
with migration. We can get to the same conclusion approaching the migration issues from the 
economic point of view. The Rule of law principle is challenged in different ways and to 
different degrees: in the relation between the EU legal order and national laws, in the 
dialectics with international institutions and conventions (such as the Ilo convention n. 143/75) 
and within the EU legal system, putting under stress the equality principle.  																																																								
9 S. Carrera, A. Faure Atger, E. Guild, D. Kostakopoulou, Labour Immigration Policy in the EU …, spec. 11.	
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From our point of view, the struggle between the EU institutions and Member States and more 
in general between the different authorities and actors playing both at national and at EU level, 
is the result of the understanding of a thin, limited concept of the Rule of law, restricted to the 
respect of the legal basis and competences in the law-making. But Rule of law has a greater 
and higher meaning when linked to his twin brothers «democracy» and «fundamental rights». 
Matched together, the three open to other important issues. 
So we think we should move from a more substantive conception of the Rule of law.  
According to Bogdandy and Ioannidis theory on systemic deficiency in the Rule of law, 
member states are presumed to respect the values of democracy, fundamental rights and Rule 
of law on which the EU is rooted. This kind of presumption is essential, being the national 
administrative and judicial apparatus the arm that enacts EU law. Indeed it is up to Member 
states’ authorities to guarantee an effective and uniform application of EU law. Even if 
infringements to the law are a normal feature in any legal system, when they get to a certain 
degree, being persistent, widespread and threatening the principles of democracy and Rule of 
law, we can say there’s a Systemic deficiency (Bogdandy, Ioannidis, 2014, 60). 
So, even if the respect of human rights falls within national competences, and even if there’s a 
presumption of compliance with art. 2 Teu by Member States, this presumption might be 
overtaken where evidence of the systemic deficiency can be sustained (Bogdandy, Ioannidis, 
2014, 91) When this happens, according to the ECJ10, there is room to suspend the secondary 
EU law and, according to the most exact doctrine, to interfere with the national sphere, at least 
under certain conditions (Bogdandy, Kottmann, Antpöhler, Dickschen, Hentrei, Smrkolj, 
2012, 508). 
In order to ascertain a systemic deficiency in the Rule of law of course, it is not enough to 
have some violations: one can figure a systemic deficiency allowing the intervention of the EU 
institutions only in case of “extreme situations”, such as the State failure or the certainty of 
systematic violations of human rights: there are some legal criteria to help drawing the concept 
and applying it correctly.  
First, the breach of the law must create a situation of future uncertainty. We argue that this is 
exactly what is happening with the migrants’ categorisation policy: not allowing migrants to 
rely on the opportunity to get a permanent permit, or preventing them from changing the kind 
of permit they have or from moving freely within the EU area, or not respecting the principle 
of equality as it has been stated in the UN conventions and in the Cfreu. 
It is important to highlight that the concept of Systemic Deficiency does not create any new 
obligation for the member states and it doesn’t even expand the EU field of action. Whether it 
allows a wider competence of the EU authorities is going to be discussed here. Asylum issues 
have already given the EU authorities the opportunity to go over the competence settings in 
order to guarantee the respect of human rights. It has been noted that art. 3 of the 2007/2004 
Regulation as amended by Regulation 1168/2011 (Frontex regulations) give the Frontex 
Executive Director the competence to suspend an operation when human rights breaches 
occur, and it has been observed that the amendment reinforced the rule of law framework in 
different ways, most of all by strengthening the principle of non-refoulment. Moreover, the 
EU Ombusman has opened its own initiatives inquiries on the forced return of migrants and it 
is well known, at least in Italy, that the Dublin Regulations haven’t been fully applied during 
the emergency in the Mediterranean Sea (Carrera, den Hertog, 2015, 6). 																																																								
10 See ECJ, 21 December, 2011, C-411/10, N.S. and Others, and ECJ, 5 Septembre 2012, C-355/10 European 
parliament v. Council of the European Union ,supported by European Commission.	
	 10	
There is also some relevant case law on this issues. In N.S., the Dublin regulations were not 
applied in order to safeguard the asylum seekers’ fundamental rights. In that case Mr. N.S., 
appealed against the decision of UK authorities to transfer him back to Greece, which is the 
place where he should have applied for asylum according to the Dublin Regulation. The Court, 
taking into consideration that the systemic deficiency in the asylum procedures assessed in 
Greece would have infringed Mr. N.S. rights, stated that Member States should not transfer 
asylum seekers to another Member state if there are “substantial grounds for believing that the 
asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment”. It 
is noteworthy that the fundamental rights protected here where not linked to citizenship as it 
did happen in Zambrano11. Fundamental rights and the respect of the rule of law here stand 
alone, meaning that they do not need the crutch of citizenship to get into force. In C-355/1012, 
the EU Parliament took action against the Council for the annulment of Council Decision 
2010/252/Eu of 26 April 2010 because it exceeded the Schengen Borders Code limits (as the 
contested decision to make SAR operations had to be adopted with a legislative act and not 
with an implementing measure). The Court stated that, event if void, the effects of the 
contested decision should be maintained until a new regulation is set because “the 
fundamental rights of the persons concerned may be interfered with to such an extent that the 
involvement of the European Union legislature is required” (point 78). In this case too, the 
fundamental rights concerned were those of non-EU citizens. 
Coming back to the issues of economic migration, from our point of view, the use of the 
Systemic Deficiency theory in the analysis of the legal framework might help at least in two 
different ways: firstly it might highlight and thus help understanding the challenges to the 
legal order that the political choices made in the recent years entail. Secondly, it might become 
in the future the legal basis on which the EU institutions may root a new horizontal approach 
to migration. It may justify a more invasive intervention of the EU, overlapping national 
competences in this filed. To tell the true, a revision of the competence settings is not 
necessary at all, for more than one reason: because the EU institutions already have a relevant 
shared competence on the basis of the subsidiarity principle, and because they have a shared 
competence also on the side of social policy. The attraction of economic migration under Title 
X Tfeu allows a path shift in migration policies. We believe that to solve many of the 
problems stemming from migration issues, it would be enough to give the priority to the 
worker status in respect of the migrant one: in other words, it would be a big deal if the labour 
standards were applied to all workers, with or without permits, with or without a legally 
binding contract, just on the basis of the coming to force of labour standards (the equality 
principle included).  
Coming to the ways in which the Rule of law is threatened by the dynamics between the EU 
legal order and national laws in the economic migration field, we might start observing that 
the Visa system has already shown how systemic deficiency in some sectors may affect 
legality and the rule of law. Groenendijk highlighted that the use of a double permit policy, 
like the German one, forcing people to choose between the EU long term permit or the 
national one, is a way for member states to escape from EU rules. And the same dynamics are 
working with the blue-card system. Its failure – with more or less 16.000 permits issued all 
																																																								
11 ECJ, 8 m arch 2001, C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano.	
12 ECJ, 5 Septembre 2012, C-355/10 European parliament v. Council of the European Union ,supported by 
European Commission.	
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over Europe - shows that the double track, both national and European, drawn for economic 
migration, is still challenging the legal EU framework. 
We can now add that the questions issued by the attractiveness of skilled workers debate are 
not so different: the lack of efficient employment services jeopardises both the European 
employment strategy and the EU competition for skilled workers. The double permit system 
developed in many EU countries here seems to hurdle the development of the EU policies 
seriously. Data clearly show that there are two different dynamics. On one side, the most 
skilled workers prefer other destinations such as Usa or Autralia to Europe; on the other side, 
there is a great problem of over-qualification (Kahanec, 2015, 48). Starting from the first issue 
mentioned above, the classic economic theory suggests that the shortage of skills depends on 
some market failures, like a lack of information or excessive regulations in training systems, 
industrial relations or migration rules. So, the first kind of measures suggested are the ones 
that try to ease the matching and to offer facilities to those who intend to migrate. This kind of 
intervention is the one adopted in the blue-card directive. However, policies based on a 
preferential treatment have some important limits. First they are frequently based on a too 
narrow measurement of the demand of skills (Kahanec, 2015, 49), and if one considered the 
difficulties and inefficiencies of the public services we have with this kind of issues for 
instance in Italy, he could realize how limited this kind of approach might be. Of course one of 
the most important hurdles in the mobility still lies in the recognition of foreign qualification 
and skills systems13. But maybe it would be a too severe analysis observing that the skills 
shortage in itself stands there witnessing the failure of the EES. Grounded on the «more jobs 
better jobs» flagship, the mismatch between offer and demand of skilled workers show the 
limits of the open method of coordination, on the one hand, and the lack of efficient 
employment services, on the other.  
Even on the basic ground of the respect of law, and leaving aside broader understandings of 
the concept (see infra), the Rule of law requires non only the respect of the law by public 
authorities and Courts but also by the private actors (Bogdandy, Ioannidis, 2014, 63). This 
means that there is a failure in the rule of law even when there is a disrespect of the law by 
private parties. As regards economic migration, this might happen both when migrants are 
illegally employed and when the minimum standards and equality of rights are infringed. 
Uncertainty on the opportunity to remain in a country after having worked there, though 
illegally, jeopardises the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial. When the law, and as far 
as our issues are concerned, when the migrants’ workers rights are broken with regularity and 
when the infringements are broadly ignored14, when institutions are seen unable to obtain law 
observation, and when, in the same time, member states do not implement the EU law 
correctly, as stated in El Dridi15 and in N.S., and when extraordinary long administrative 
procedures jeopardise migrants’ rights, we can say that the Rule of law is threatened.  
Given a broad meaning to the Rule of law linked to fundamental rights, a severe challenge 
comes from the great bazaar of inequalities in migrants’ working conditions. The question 
comes to a crossroad between national, EU and international conventions. The differences in 
working and staying conditions between long-term permits, blue card or seasonal permits 																																																								
13 The professional Qualifications Directive applies to selected third country citizens: family members of Eu 
cuitizens (dir. 2004/38), refugees (dir. 2004/83) long term residents (dir. 2003/109) EU Blue Card Holeders 
(2009/%=) researchers (dir. 2005/71), but with several limits: it does not impose the recognition of those 
Qualifications acquired in third countries but only the ones acquired in a Eu State	
14 According to Bodgandy and p. 79 the quality of contract enforcement  is an indicator of systemic deficiency is 	
15 EWCJ, 28 April 2011, C-61/11, El Dridi.	
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owners look like a labyrinth of precariousness and discrimination. Most scholars have already 
considered the categorisation and sectorial approach as discriminatory in nature; the reduction 
of labour and social security rights drawn by the recent directive on seasonal workers, so-
called the directive of suspicion, challenges the ILO standards and has some social and 
economic costs that have already been highlighted (Cholewinski, 2015, 23). We refer here 
both to the reduction of Europe’s attractiveness for skilled workers and to the broader societal 
costs incidental to the creation of a second class of workers and individuals. From a legal point 
of view, the categorisation policy challenges severely the principle of non-discrimination 
stated in art. 21 of Cfreu, and indirectly in dir. 43/2000/EC, engendering a broad set of 
problems concerning the legitimacy of secondary law. Moreover, the discriminatory effect 
goes hand in hand with the uncertainty of rights, again affecting the EU Rule of law. It has 
clearly been noted that one of the effects of categorisation in the complexity of law, with 
different words for the same legal issue, subject regulated in different ways in the various 
directives and so on. 
Finally, given the Systemic deficiency in the Rule of law in the sector of economic migration, 
what kind of instruments and measures can we display? The highway is of course art. 7 TEU: 
the suspension of Member States rights until the State does not respect art. 2 TEU. 
Nevertheless this is a very strong remedy that might never be applied, because of its severe 
drawbacks and because of the inadequacy of the remedies provided to solve the problems of 
systemic deficiency (Bogdandy, Ioannidis, 2014, 84). Despite that, special mechanisms of 
cooperation and verification and specific adjustment programmes, similar to the one drawn for 
the EU economic governance, can be put into force. Will Europe fight the systemic deficiency 
in migrants’ rights with the same resolution it had with the economic crisis? 
Can we consider the respect of the legal framework in the field of labour law as a precondition 
for economic stability and thus link the economic programmes and scores to this goal? 
According to the Systemic Deficiency Rule of law theory there is room for EU institutions to 
set conditions for the purpose of putting pressure on member states to adopt reforms; there is 
room for technical assistance to member states to implement policies aiming at restoring the 
legal framework; most of all, we believe there is finally room for a shift from the area of 
freedom security and justice to the social policy chapter. 
 
One step beyond in this direction has been done with Tümer case. 
 
6 . – The directive permits and equal treatment for regular workers and the equal treatment 
for irregular workers (after Tümer case).  - The directives approved on the basis of the 
dispositions of Title V TFEU (ex Title IV TEC) are a tangible, concrete example of the 
general policies discussed above: normative binding acts intended to translate general 
institutional and policy lines into concrete rules for economic migration. It is a great 
opportunity to reflect not upon the social model of the EU citizen but on his double, the 
mirrored image of the non-EU workers (also irregular).  
Work is precisely the main object of our attention.  
The production before and after Lisbon does not appear to be marked by a substantial 
interruption between past and present, a break actually recorded in 2001 with a decisive 
change of direction on this topic, marked by support for criminalization and for every form of 
migration control, politically sustained by the struggle against terrorism after the attacks of 
September 11. A clear trace of the relevance of security can be found in the abandonment of 
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the term «circulation» from the rubric of Title V of TFEU16.  
In this context, an important signal in this process was launched by the Court of Justice in its 
judgment Tümer, recalling that the principle of equal treatment in EU law with regard to 
regular workers is stated by art. 12 Dir . 2011/9817.  
It is a very simple case. A worker who lost his residence permit becomes irregular. The Dutch 
government believes that he cannot be considered as an employee under dir. 80/987 on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the protection of employees in the 
event of the insolvency of their employer. 
In its observations to the Court, the Netherlands Government argues that «Directive 80/987 
does not apply to ‘illegally staying third-country nationals’, since Article 137(2) EC, the legal 
basis for that directive, does not cover third-country nationals. The application of Directive 
80/987 to that category would, moreover, be contrary to the European Union’s policy on 
immigration and, in particular, to Directive 2003/109, which confers a right to equal treatment, 
notably in relation to social security, only on third-country nationals who are legally resident 
in a Member State. In that regard, it would be enough to state, first, that — as the Advocate 
General pointed out in point 51 of his Opinion — competence under Article 137(2) EC to 
adopt minimum requirements to improve living and working conditions, that is the objective 
referred to in Article 136 EC, is not limited so as to concern only the living and working 
conditions of nationals of Member States, to the exclusion of third-country nationals». 
We stress two passages where the Court writes - faced with the Dutch resistance to the 
payment of wages to the worker (irregular occurred, an employer in insolvency):  
– that Under Article 1(1) of Directive 80/987 «that directive applies to employees’ 
claims arising from contracts of employment or employment relationships and existing 																																																								
16 Leaving out the sectors of asylum and management of frontiers, to dwell on immigration, indicating for 
demands of completeness, the dir. 2003/86 concerning family reunifications and dir. 2003/109 relating to the 
status of non-EU citizens living long term in the EU. After Lisbon or rather the project desired in the French 
semester of immigration chosen and concerted, is accompanied to approval by four directives (in substantial 
continuity with the programmatic acts of 2005 and 2006) and the preparation of two others waiting for approval. 
Secondly, the same legislator is based on the repressive-punitive logic (of employers: dir. 2009/52) without any 
concern for the position and/or the vulnerability of the irregular workers, and to the tactic of expulsion of 
irregular workers, in general (dir. 2008/15) two directives which have the same logic, as the totality of the 
doctrine which analyses them concludes. At the present state and leaving out any operation of future regulative 
consolidation through a European Union immigration code, more or less innovating given regulative 
arrangements, the intervention of the European Union legislator for employment can base himself firstly on the 
fragmentation of the operative model through an internal distinction between the positions of non-EU workers of 
low and high qualifications (dir. 2009/50); or between seasonal and non-seasonal workers as indicated (dir. 
2014/36/eu of the European Parliament and of the council of 26 February 2014 on the conditions of entry and 
stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal) or again can distinguish mobility 
outside the company from mobility with a company as inserted in the proposal (Com(2010) 378 def.).  Dir. 
2011/98 deals with a single request procedure for the issue of a permit allowing non-EU citizens to stay and work 
in a member state and to a common set of rights for non-EU workers who reside regularly in a member state. 
That directive seems to be an intervention which renders uniform rights and procedures «reductive proposal in 
respect of 2001», a cautious attempt to reaffirm the responsibilities (almost exclusive of the member states) and at 
the same time, to regularize the procedures and affirm a downgraded principle of equal treatment for regular 
workers.	
17 Art. 12 , dir. 2011/98 is concerned with the right to equal treatment for regular workers, widely set aside the 
conformity of which to the Convention ILO 143/75 is needed; this latter shares the same object of regulation but 
a different field of application. The same Recital 28 recognises that the directive «ought to apply without 
prejudice the most favourable dispositions contained in the law of the Union and in the applicable national 
instruments».	
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against employers who are in a state of insolvency within the meaning of Article 2(1) 
of that directive»; 
– In that regard, it should be noted that, in view of the social objective of Directive 
80/987 and the terms of Article 1(1), under which the directive is to apply ‘to 
employees’ claims arising from contracts of employment or employment 
relationships’, the definition of the term ‘employee’ necessarily refers to an 
employment relationship that gives rise to a right, held vis-à-vis the employer, to 
receive payment for work done. In the present case, those elements are present in the 
definition of the term ‘employee’ under the civil law of the Netherlands. 
The Advocate General Bot, in his conclusion, had already recognized that: 
«To my mind, the exclusion from the scope of Directive 80/987 of persons who may properly 
be described as ‘employees’ under the general rules of national law is at odds with the 
essential purpose of that directive and liable to frustrate its effectiveness. In my opinion, 
although that directive allows Member States to define the term ‘employee’, it none the less 
requires them to do so in such a way that the definition used to determine the scope of the 
measures transposing that directive matches the definition in force in their national 
employment law, so that any ‘employee’ within the meaning of national law will be eligible 
for the guaranteed settlement of pay claims. In other words, the geometry of the definition of 
‘employee’ cannot vary according to whether the relationship in question is between the 
worker and his employer or between the worker and the guarantee fund. Secondly, making the 
right to the guaranteed settlement of pay claims conditional, in the case of an employee who is 
a third-country national, upon legal residence is not, to my way of thinking, consistent with the 
principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination. That principle is a general principle of 
EU law enshrined not least in Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, the provisions of which are addressed both to the institutions, bodies and 
agencies of the European Union and to the Member States when they are implementing EU 
law, as is clear in particular from Article 51(1) of the Charter. Now, when, within the 
framework of the reference to national law under Article 2(2) of Directive 80/987, a Member 
State defines the categories of employee to which that directive is to apply, it is implementing 
EU law and must therefore observe the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination. 
According to settled case-law, that principle requires that comparable situations must not be 
treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such 
treatment is objectively justified. The Court has held that the elements which characterise 
situations, hence their comparability, must be determined and assessed in the light of the 
subject-matter and purpose of the EU act which makes the distinction in question. The 
principles and objectives of the field to which the act relates must also be taken into account. 
According to the Court, the same approach must be taken, mutatis mutandis, in assessing 
whether national measures implementing EU law are consistent with the principle of equal 
treatment. As I pointed out earlier, it can be seen from the information provided by the 
referring court that, under Netherlands civil law, third-country nationals who are illegally 
resident may have the status of employees and may seek the payment of remuneration on the 
basis of their employment contract. However, Article 3(3) of the WW reserves different 
treatment for them in the event of the insolvency of their employer, in that it excludes them 
from the right to the guaranteed settlement of their outstanding pay claims. Such a difference 
in treatment is not objectively justified» (Opinion Bot, point 68-76). 
 
This new series of reflections arising from labour law appear to originate in EU immigration 
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policy, the double of the social model of the origins in which it has not stopped mirroring 
itself, also imposing an unavoidable question of method about the “categorisation” or the 
“isolation” of questions about the employment of migrant workers opening juridical 
considerations within the dimension of ‘Social Europe’.  
Even if one discusses the very existence of the European social model, its final construction 
needs an extra balancing between security and social solidarity (for foreigners), not only by 
taking advantage of the opportunity offered by the link with that slender competence 
sanctioned by art. 153, lett. g, TFEU, but in more general terms, with respect to the 
competences implied in Title V regarding labour immigration policy. The search for a social 
perimeter within which EU labour law matters need to be taken into consideration must 
include, rather than exclude, questions about non-EU citizens. Such an extension seems to 
inevitably require a genealogical re-reading of the community social dimension, between a 
consolidated past, far from the present, but a perhaps less uncertain future of the enhancement 
of the multi-layered rights of the individuals in movement. 
 
When the principle of equal treatment is applied in areas excluded (irregular workers), it is 
unlikely to be stopped. Remember the P case? 
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